From Matthew Hassan at Westpac:
The CoreLogic home value index held flat in Oct taking annual growth to 7%yr, an abrupt slowdown from the 11.4%yr peak in May.
Policy measures continue to have a material impact. Although official rates remain near historic lows, regulators introduced a new round of ‘macro prudential’ tightening measures in late March. Meanwhile a range of other changes have also seen a progressive tightening of conditions facing foreign buyers.
….Sydney continues to record the sharpest turnaround in conditions, annual price growth slowing to 7.7%yr in Oct, essentially halving since Jul. Melbourne continues to see a much milder turn with price growth still tracking at 11%yr.
….The houses vs units breakdown shows a more pronounced slowdown for houses with annual price growth slowing to 7.2%yr from 12.4% in May. Our monthly seasonally adjusted estimates suggest prices have been declining at about a 2% annualised pace over the last 3mths. ….Notably, the detail suggests the pace of unit price declines in Brisbane and Perth is moderating while price growth in Melbourne units has shown essentially no slowing to date.
The slowdown is likely to carry through to year end. However, the next few months will be a critical gauge of whether markets are starting to stabilise. To date, the timeliest market measures – buyer sentiment, auction clearance rates and prices – are showing few signs of levelling out. However, some of the pressure from macro-prudential measures may ease off a little.
China’s crackdown on capital flight seems to be having an impact on housing prices in Australia. Whether this is sufficient to cause a collapse of the property bubble is doubtful unless there is a general decline in prices, causing mortgage lenders to tighten credit standards.
The banking sector remains my major concern. With CET1 leverage ratios between 4 and 5 percent, the sector could act as an accelerant rather than a buffer (Murray Inquiry) in an economic downturn.
A note on Leverage Ratios:
I use Tier 1 Common Equity (CET1) to calculate leverage rather than the more commonly used Common Equity which includes certain classes of bank hybrids — convertible to common equity in the event of a crisis — as part of capital. Inclusion of hybrids as capital is misleading as conversion of a single hybrid would be likely to panic the entire financial system (rather like a money market fund “breaking the buck”). In the recent banking crisis in Italy, regulators chose not to exercise the conversion option for fear of financial contagion. Instead the Italian government was called on to bail out the distressed banks. Same could happen here.